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November 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders
Samuel M. Hoskinson

SUBJECT: Late Reporting on Palestinian Objectives

In view of coming SRG discussion of the Palestinian issue, we strongly recommend that you read the few choice reports attached:

MORI C05097200

-- At Tab A are three reports from our Consul General in Jerusalem reporting the views of West Bank Palestinians. There is some ground to be wary about these because, of course, they are based mainly on the views of those West Bankers who talk with Americans. On the other hand, they are the best sounding of West Bank views we have. 25X1

West Bank Palestinians

Based on close and continuing contacts with all segments of the West Bank Palestinian population, the Consul General in Jerusalem believes that:

-- West Bankers are confused in their thinking, divided in their loyalties, suspicious of everybody, paralyzed by their fear of the Israelis and frustrated by their inability to visualize what the future holds for them.

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--Above all the West Bankers all want an end to the Israeli occupation and they want this through a peaceful settlement. They realize that the state of Israel is here to stay--hopefully with its pre-1967 borders--and believe that only the U.S. can force Israel into a peace acceptable to the Arabs. Nasser's sudden death has somewhat shaken their hopes for a peace settlement.

--With few exceptions, they realize that a West Bank political entity is not a practical solution for their problems and there is virtually no support for such a separate political solution. "Jordan with both banks is barely a state."

--Despite some bitterness resulting from the civil war in Jordan, most West Bankers would prefer to be reunited with Jordan, although they insist that the system in the Hashemite Kingdom must be radically changed. They accept the possibility of continued rule by King Hussein but come down hard on the need for a real constitutional monarchy under which power is decentralized and they are able to effectively participate in the direction of the country.

--Most West Bankers proclaim their support for the fedayeen but almost none are willing to risk anything more than verbal support for a movement which they feel is close to their ideal but woefully incapable of even making a dent on Israeli occupation. They can see with their own eyes that the fedayeen idea of eliminating the Zionist state is just not going to happen.

What this all seems to boil down to is that aside from "peace" and relief from Israeli occupation the West Bank Palestinians lean toward a two stage process in which Hussein would negotiate the return of the West Bank and the West Bankers would then work out with him a greater degree of autonomy within Jordan.

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A-149

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

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INFO: AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, USUN New York

DEPT PASS: ALGIERS, JIDDA, KUWAIT, RABAT, TRIPOLI, TUNIS

FROM : AmConsul Jerusalem

DATE: October 21, 1970

SUBJECT : West Bank Reaction to Nasser's Death and
the Civil War in Jordan

REF :

The civil war in Jordan and the death of President Nasser have had a profound, unsettling effect on the West Bank. While it is difficult to assess the ultimate "meaning" of what has happened, certain points are clear:

1. The civil war in Jordan drove Hussein's popularity and prestige to a new low on the West Bank.
2. Resentment against the King is still pronounced, but has generally not manifested itself in a desire to establish a separate Palestinian State on the West Bank.
3. Most West Bankers are realistic enough to recognize, as one of them put it, that "Jordan with both banks is barely a state," and that a separate West Bank entity, under the best of circumstances, is simply not viable.
4. Even if a West Bank state were desirable, Israel would not accede to its establishment in any form acceptable to the Arabs.
5. West Bankers want to be reunited with Jordan, but at the same time insist that the system in the Hashemite Kingdom must be radically changed. Despite current bitterness, they still accept the possibility of continued rule by Hussein but they come down hard on the need for a constitutional monarchy, decentralization of power, and participation of all parties (i.e. the Palestinians) in

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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the direction of the country. In the absence of a true constitutional monarchy, most West Bankers would feel that the monarchy would have to go.

6. President Nasser's death came at a particularly bad time for West Bankers since it deprived them of their leader-by-proxy at precisely the time they were bitterly disillusioned with their titular monarch.
7. With Nasser dead and Hussein discredited - at least for the time being - West Bankers are faced with the problem of where to look for redemption, or even inspiration.
8. Many West Bankers saw Nasser as the one Arab leader who could say "Yes" to the Israelis, make peace, and lift the occupation. In this sense, Nasser is irreplaceable, and his loss could have an erosive effect on West Bankers' will to stand fast under Israeli occupation.
9. Sympathy for the Fedayeen during the fighting of mid-September undoubtedly increased, but although most West Bankers continue to support the Fedayeen as the symbol of Palestinian resistance to the Israelis, almost none are willing to risk anything beyond lip service to the movement. In any case it is highly doubtful if many of them who have seen the strength and dedication of the Israeli state during the past three years' occupation have any illusions about the theory of the Zionist state fading away in favor of a secular Palestinian state where Arabs would be in the majority.
10. The concurrence of Nasser's death and the civil war in Jordan has generated a flurry of politics on the West Bank: high Israeli officials are meeting with West Bank Mayors and politicians, there is talk in the Israeli press of some sort of "autonomy" for the region and of "the time being ripe" for West Bankers to "take an initiative," prominent Nablusis fly off to Cairo, and a group of younger West Bank "intellectuals and professionals" forms a "New Alignment" to seek alternative courses of action.
11. When Nasser was alive and there was some semblance of order in Jordan, peace seemed attainable, even after the initial euphoria created by the American initiative had evaporated. With Nasser's death West Bankers are faced with the prospect of no war, no peace, no withdrawal, no Palestinian State, no deliverance. Israeli occupation, once endurable because it was considered transient, now seems increasingly open-ended.

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COMMENT:

The situation has obviously changed, and in all probability to the detriment of the West Bank Palestinians. It is difficult to imagine anything of substance emerging from any "initiative" which the Palestinians might be able to take. Aside from "peace" and relief from Israeli occupation, West Bankers have no clear idea what they want. Perhaps more importantly, with no patron and no quid pro quo to offer they would go empty-handed into any negotiations with the Israelis; even if they could agree on an objective, they probably could not achieve it.

In the circumstances, their best hope would appear to lie in supporting Hussein who with American backing might be able to lift the Israeli occupation; once this is achieved, the Palestinians could set about establishing a more representative state.

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM 503

SUBJECT: SEPARATE PEACE WITH WEST BANK RULED OUT

REF: JERUSALEM'S 485 AND A-149

1. JERUSALEM POST NOVEMBER 1 QUOTED POLICE MINISTER
SHLOMO HILLEL AS RULING OUT THE IDEA OF ISRAEL'S
MAKING PEACE WITH A SEPARATE WEST BANK ENTITY.

2. MR. HILLEL WHO HAS RECENTLY BEEN CONDUCTING
EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH WEST BANK LEADERS WAS QUOTED AS
SAYING THAT HE HAD NOT FOUND A SINGLE SUPPORTER OF A
SEPARATE POLITICAL SOLUTION. HE SAID, QUOTE, THE DESTINIES
OF ARABS IN THE ADMINISTERED AREAS AND THE ENP#PALESTINIANS
LIVING IN JORDAN CANNOT BE SEPARATED. UNQUOTE.

3. COMMENT: OUR RECENT CONTACTS AMONG WEST BANKERS
STRONGLY SUPPORT MR. HILLEL'S CONCLUSION. IN A TYPICAL
CONVERSATION WITH CONGENOFFS ON OCTOBER 29, MAYOR HAJ
MAZOUZ AL-MASRI OF NABLUS AND FORMER MINISTER QADRI TOUKAN
SAID FLATLY THAT THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN THE SEPARATE
ENTITY CONCEPT OR SEPARATE PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL.
THEY SAID IN EFFECT QUOTE YOU AMERICANS GET THE ISRAELIS
OUT OF THE WEST BANK AS PART OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH
JORDAN AND THEN LET US WORRY ABOUT OUR POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS
WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. UNQUOTE.

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SECRET JERUSALEM 485

DEPT PASS: CAIRO

SUBJECT: USG RELATIONS WITH FEDAYEEN

REF: STATE 169856

1. FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS CONSULATE GENERAL JERUSALEM HAS BEEN IN CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONTACT WITH ALL SEGMENTS OF WEST BANK PALESTINIAN POPULATION, ESPECIALLY THE TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP BUT ALSO INCLUDING ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH PALESTINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND EVEN SOME IN TOUCH WITH FEDAYEEN. ON THE BASIS OF THIS EXPERIENCE, WE WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT SOME THOUGHTS ON (A) INCREASING OUR ASSETS AMONG PALESTINIANS AND (B) RELATING PALESTINIANISM TO THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PROCESS.



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2. WE UNDERSTAND OF COURSE THAT THE REACTIONS OF THE WEST BANKERS LIVING UNDER THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION MAY NOT BE PRECISELY THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE PALESTINIAN IN EAST JORDAN OR IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. NONETHELESS WE BELIEVE THEIR ATTITUDES ARE VALID REFLECTIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PSYCHE AND DESERVE CONSIDERATION AT LEAST EQUAL TO THAT GIVEN TO PALESTINIANS WHO DO NOT KNOW AT FIRST HAND THE REALITIES OF THE OCCUPATION. THE FOLLOWING, WE BELIEVE,

IS A FAIR SUMMARY OF THESE WEST BANK ATTITUDES:

- (A) WEST BANKERS ARE CONFUSED IN THEIR THINKING, DIVIDED IN THEIR LOYALTIES, SUSPICIOUS OF EVERYBODY, PARALYZED BY FEAR OF THE ISRAELIS, AND FRUSTRATED BY THEIR INABILITY TO VISUALIZE WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR THEM.
- (B) ABOVE ALL THEY WANT AN END TO THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION.
- (C) THEY WANT THIS BROUGHT ABOUT THROUGH PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL.
- (D) THEY KNOW ISRAEL IS HERE TO STAY--HOPEFULLY WITHIN ITS 1967 BORDERS.
- (E) THEY BELIEVE--EVEN THOUGH THEY SOMETIMES ALMOST GIVE UP BECAUSE OF THEIR CONVICTION THAT US IS BASICALLY PRO-ISRAEL--THAT ONLY THE USG CAN FORCE ISRAEL INTO A PEACE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS.
- (F) THEY ALL PROFESS TO THE MYSTIQUE OF PALESTINIANISM (BUT THERE ISN'T A SINGLE ONE OF THEM WHO CAN DEFINE THIS PHENOMENON IN ANY MEANINGFUL TERMS OR OUTLINE ON THE BASIS OF PALESTINIANISM A REALISTIC PROGRAM OF POLITICAL ACTION.)
- (G) MOST PROCLAIM THEIR SUPPORT OF THE FEDAYEEN--BUT ALMOST NONE ARE WILLING TO RISK ANYTHING MORE THAN VERBAL SUPPORT FOR A MOVEMENT WHICH THEY FEEL IS CLOSE TO THEIR IDEAL BUT WOEFULLY INCAPABLE OF EVEN MAKING A DENT IN THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION.
- (H) THEY CAN SEE WITH THEIR OWN EYES THAT THE FEDAYEEN IDEA OF ELIMINATING THE ZIONIST STATE JUST ISN'T GOING TO HAPPEN.
- (I) WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS--THEY RECOGNIZE THAT A WEST BANK PALESTINIAN ENTITY IS NOT A PRACTICAL SOLUTION FOR THEIR PROBLEMS.
- (J) THEY NEVER HAVE LIKE THE HASHEMITE REGIME AND THEY BLAME HUSSEIN AND HIS GENERALS FOR THE RECENT FIGHTING IN EAST JORDAN. BUT, AFTER THEIR FIRST EMOTIONAL REACTIONS TO THE BLOODLETTING, THEY ARE AGAIN SETTLING DOWN TO WHAT WE BELIEVE HAS BEEN THEIR BASIC ATTITUDE RIGHT ALONG.



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THEY BELIEVE IN A UNITED JORDAN ON BOTH BANKS OF THE RIVER, BUT WITH MUCH GREATER PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THAT STATE. THEY ACCEPT THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HUSSEIN WILL REMAIN THE LEADER OF THE STATE AND IS PROBABLY BEST QUALIFIED TO LEAD IT. CERTAINLY THEY UNDERSTAND THAT HUSSEIN IS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO OBTAIN A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL-- ESPECIALLY WITH US BACKING-- THAN ANY OTHER POLITICAL LEADER OR GROUP AT PRESENT IN SIGHT.

3. IF THE ABOVE OUTLINE OF PALESTINIAN ATTITUDES IS VALID, WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS ARE INDICATED AS FAR AS US POLICY TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS IS CONCERNED:

(A) WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BROADEN OUR PALESTINIAN CONTACTS EVERYWHERE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND WE MIGHT WELL HAVE OCCASIONAL AND INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS.

(B) BUT WE SHOULD AVOID ANY SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN-- EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT-- WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS AN ATTEMPT TO LEAVE A SINKING SHIP IN ORDER TO JUMP ABOARD A NEW ARAB BANDWAGON. SUCH A CAMPAIGN WHEN IT BECAME KNOWN (AND IT WOULD) WOULD ONLY DISSIPATE SUCH SUPPORT AS THE PALESTINIANS EXTEND TO KING HUSSEIN. AND IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT GAIN US ANY REAL INFLUENCE IN A DIVIDED AND CONFUSED MOVEMENT CALLED PALESTINIANISM WHICH WE COULD HARDLY TRUST, IS UNLIKELY EVER TO COOPERATE WITH US, AND MAY IN ANY CASE PROVE NO MORE SOLID AND DURABLE THAN THE MUCH MORE VALID IDEA OF ARAB UNITY WHICH APPEARED SO TEMPTING TO MANY OF US IN THE 1950S BUT STILL TODAY REMAINS AN ARABIAN CHIMERA.

(C) IN OUR CONTINUING AND EXPANDED PALESTINIAN CONTACTS, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS UPON THEM OUR CONVICTION THAT THEY SHOULD SUPPORT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT; THAT US POLICY EMBODIED IN THE ROGERS PLAN IS THE ARABS' BEST HOPE FOR A FAIR AND JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB ISRAEL CONFLICT; AND THAT THE PLAN INDEED TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

(D) REGARDING THE LATTER POINT, WE SHOULD ON ONE HAND URGE THE PALESTINIANS TO COOPERATE WITH HUSSEIN IN THE US PEACE INITIATIVE, AND ON THE OTHER URGE HUSSEIN TO BROADEN THE BASE OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE AS MANY PALESTINIANS AS POSSIBLE, AND CONTINUE TO ASSURE THE PALESTINIANS THAT THEY WILL BE ALLOWED AN EXPRESSION OF SELF-DETERMINATION DURING NEGOTIATION OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT OR AT A LATER APPROPRIATE TIME.

(E) WE SHOULD HAVE NO ISSUSSIONS THAT THE ABOVE COURSE OF ACTION WILL BE COMPLETELY CONVINCING TO THE PALESTINIANS. IN



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FACT NOTHING WOULD SATISFY THEM SHOULD OF AN AMERICAN PROMISE TO FORCE THE ISRAELIS TO GO BACK TO THE 1967 FRONTIERS AND A GUARANTEE OF A MUCH MORE FAVORABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM THAN ANYTHING THAT SEEMS VERY REALISTIC AT THE MOMENT. (F) AS FOR ASSOCIATING OURSELVES MORE CLOSELY WITH PALESTINIANISM, WE DOUBT IF THAT COULD BE DONE WITHOUT OPENLY INDICATING OUR SUPPORT FOR THE FEDAYEEN IN ITS STRUGGLE WITH KING HUSSEIN FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF THE JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN STATE.

*. THUS WE BELIEVE WE MUST REALISTICALLY FACE THE FACT THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES A BROADENING OF CONTACTS WITH PALESTINIANS IS UNLIKELY TO RETURN MORE THAN LIMITED BENEFITS TOWARD (A) INCREASING OUR ASSETS AMONG PALESTINIANS OR (B) RELATING PALESTINIANISM TO THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PROCESS. BUT WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE PATIENT EXPLANATION OF US POLICY AND ESPECIALLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ROGERS PLAN TO PALESTINIANS EVERYWHERE CAN HAVE SOME BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON THEIR THINKING. THIS IS AS MUCH AS WE CAN HOPE FOR UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE A STRONGER PALESTINIAN LINE AGAINST THE ISRAELIS AND UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO DETACH OURSELVES FROM HUSSEIN AND ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH THE PALESTINIANS. GP-3 CAMPBELL

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